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Abstract
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution
mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate
conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of
binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to
the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are
mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution
mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher
when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed,
commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to
opt-in.
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1. Introduction
Since Schelling (1960) initiated the formal study of conflict, economists and others have
developed numerous models highlighting the resources wasted when conflict occurs (Tullock,
1980; Konrad, 2009). Empirical studies testing these models indicate that in practice the costs of
conflict are substantially higher than predicted by the theory (Dechenaux et al., 2012; Sheremeta,
2013). For this reason, there has been extensive research on mechanisms of conflict resolution
that allow parties to avoid to these costs, all of which depend on the ability to make credible
commitments and/or binding contracts enforced by a third party (see e.g. Schelling 1960,
Williamson 1985, Charness et al. 2007, Kimbrough et al. 2012; Kimbrough and Sheremeta,
2013). Yet, in reality, many conflict resolution efforts cannot rely on credible commitments or
enforceable contracts.
The problems associated with the inability to commit are well known: in the absence of
credible commitment, parties on the less favored side of any proposed resolution face incentives
to ignore the resolution. For example, a country that finds a UN resolution counter to its interests
could simply exit the organization and ignore the international community. A similar
commitment problem can help to explain the failures of recent WTO negotiations and the Kyoto
Protocol.1 Agreements between individuals often face similar problems, especially when thirdparty enforcement mechanisms are unavailable. Historically, weak and decentralized political
rule made many contractual agreements legally unenforceable (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif et al.,
1994; Greif, 2000), and similar troubles plague contemporary societies where the rule of law is
absent or weak. Even when the rule of law is present many contracts remain unenforceable, and
commitment problems arise due to imperfect information and incomplete contracts (Harris and
Raviv, 1979; Holmström, 1979; Baker, 1992; Tirole, 1999).
1

See Powell (2006) for a discussion of commitment problems and armed conflict between nations.

1

Given the ubiquity of commitment problems in conflict resolution, there has been
surprisingly little empirical work exploring the possibility of conflict resolution in the absence of
binding commitments. 2 In this paper, we explore whether (and how) non-binding conflict
resolution mechanisms reduce conflict and overcome commitment problems under rather
extreme conditions. We conduct an experiment where participants face potential conflict over a
valuable, indivisible resource. Parties may choose to allocate the resource by costly conflict (i.e.,
a rent-seeking contest), or they can choose to employ a conflict resolution mechanism that
allocates the resource at random (i.e., a coin flip), allowing them to avoid the costs of fighting.
However, for this mechanism to be effective, both participants must first opt-in to learn the
proposed allocation and then mutually commit to the outcome. If either party chooses not to
commit, the parties then fight over the resource. The indivisibility of the resource is crucial here
because it creates a particularly “hard case” for conflict resolution efforts: commitment requires
one party to accept extreme inequality.
Clearly, standard game theoretic arguments predict that even if both parties opt-in to
observe the proposed allocation, the losing party will never commit to the outcome.
Nevertheless, we observe many instances in which individuals avoid conflict by committing to
the outcome of a coin flip; conflict resolution rates range between 20%-54%, depending on the
treatment. Moreover, commitment problems are further mitigated when groups endogenously
choose to opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly.
Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously

2

See the review of experimental literature on conflicts by Dechenaux et al. (2012). Several conflict resolution
mechanisms have been examined in the lab, including side-payments (Charness et al., 2007; Kimbrough and
Sheremeta, 2012, 2013), pre-commitment to an allocation proposed by a random device (Kimbrough et al., 2012),
and communication (Cason et al., 2013). Also, some animal behavior studies indicate that many non-human species
employ non-binding resource-allocation conventions built around asymmetries between parties that are uncorrelated
with their fighting abilities (Petrie et al., 1991; Maher and Lott, 2000).

2

imposed (in many instances pairs do not opt-in), commitment problems are greatly reduced
amongst those groups that opt-in.
Thus, our paper makes two key contributions. First, we provide evidence that conflict
resolution efforts can overcome commitment problems, even when resolutions generate extreme
payoff inequality. This suggests that the prospects for reducing the costs of conflict are not as
bleak as standard theory would suggest (Tullock, 1980; Konrad, 2009). This finding assumes
additional importance given the extensive experimental literature demonstrating the very high
costs of conflict (Dechenaux et al., 2012; Sheremeta, 2013).3 Second, we show that commitment
problems can be further mitigated by imposing explicit costs for using conflict resolution
mechanisms.4 A costly mechanism serves two purposes: it encourages reciprocity because parties
both know that their counterpart paid a cost to potentially avoid conflict, and it facilitates selfselection, since individuals who are unwilling to commit are less likely to incur the cost in the
first place. Thus, we argue that designers of conflict resolution mechanisms should consider
ways of ensuring that parties are invested in the conflict resolution process, and we hope that
theorists can further develop models to explain the source of this effect.

2. Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1. Experimental Design
Our experiment employs a simple conflict resolution game in which participants play a repeated
game with a known ending, repeatedly bargaining over an indivisible resource valued at v by
3

Sheremeta (2013) reviews 30 conflict experiments and finds that in 28 of those experiments individuals exert
significantly higher conflict expenditures than predicted. In some conflict experiments the expenditures are so high
that the majority of individuals earn negative payoffs (Sheremeta, 2010; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012).
4
There is a large literature in biology suggesting that costly signals are more reliable than cheap signals (Zahavi,
1975, 1993; Grafen, 1990; Petrie et al., 1991). Likewise, there is a significant literature in the economics of religion
suggesting that costly or stigmatizing religious rituals dramatically increase cooperation within religious “clubs”
(Iannaccone, 1992, 1994; Berman, 2000; Abramitzky, 2008; Aimone et al., 2013; Carvalho 2013).
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both players. The game, shown in Figure 1, consists of three stages. In Stage 1, participants
choose whether or not to use the conflict resolution device by choosing either ‘Flip’ or ‘Don’t
Flip’. If at least one participant chooses Don’t Flip then neither participant incurs any cost, and
both proceed to Stage 3. If both participants choose to Flip then they each incur a cost c, and
after observing a realization of a fair coin flip, which provisionally assigns the resource to one
player, they proceed to Stage 2. In Stage 2, participants decide whether to ‘Agree’ to the
proposed allocation. If both participants choose Agree (i.e., if they choose to commit) then the
participant who was favored by the coin flip receives v = 100 francs, and the game is over.
However, if at least one participant chooses ‘Don’t Agree’, then both participants proceed to
Stage 3. In Stage 3, both participants participate in a lottery contest to allocate the resource. In
the lottery contest, both participants make irreversible conflict expenditures e1 and e2 to increase
their probabilities of receiving the prize, i.e., pi(e1,e2) = ei/(e1+e2).
Using backwards induction and assuming risk neutrality, the Nash equilibrium in Stage 3
is for both participants to choose expenditures of e1* = e2* = 25 (Tullock, 1980), receiving the
expected payoff of 25 each (v/2-e* = 50-25). Because each participant has a positive expected
value from conflict in Stage 3, a participant interested in maximizing her wealth should not
commit to the outcome after losing the coin flip. Therefore, in any subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, money-maximizing participants end up in a conflict Stage 3 regardless of the cost of
the coin flip c and exert wasteful expenditures competing for the resource. Since conflict is
certain along the equilibrium path, it follows that participants are indifferent between opting-in
and not opting-in if and only if the cost of opting-in is zero (i.e., c = 0), and they will never optin when doing so is costly (i.e., c > 0).
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To examine whether a non-binding coin flip can reduce the cost of conflict, we employ a
partial two-by-two experimental design. On one dimension, we vary whether the decision to optin is endogenous or exogenous, and on the other dimension, we vary whether opting-in carries a
cost. For obvious reasons, we impose the cost only when opting-in is endogenous, hence our
partial design. In the Exogenous-Free baseline treatment, participants first observe the outcome
of a coin flip. That is, there is no Stage 1 decision to ‘Flip’ or ‘Don’t Flip’; instead, the ‘Flip’
decision is exogenously imposed. In Stage 2, they decide whether to commit to the outcome. If
either participant disagrees then the game proceeds to Stage 3. In Stage 3, participants participate
in a simple two-person contest for the resource valued at 100. In the Endogenous-Free treatment,
participants first endogenously decide whether to observe the outcome of a coin flip for free in
Stage 1. Then in Stage 2 they decide whether to commit to the outcome. If either participant
disagrees in either Stage 1 or Stage 2 then the game proceeds to Stage 3. Finally, the
Endogenous-Costly treatment is similar to the Endogenous-Free treatment, however, opting-in in
Stage 1 is costly, i.e., c = 5 francs.

2.2. Experimental Procedures
To study behavior in the proposed treatments, a total of 198 participants were recruited at
random from the subject-pool consisting of graduate and undergraduate students at a private
university in the United States. Participants received a participation fee for arriving to the
experiment on time and received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each session.
Participants were randomly assigned into treatments (44 in Exogenous-Free, 62 in EndogenousFree and 92 in Endogenous-Costly) and nobody participated more than once.5 Participants sat at,
and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and instructions were read aloud by the
5

Our design was unbalanced to generate comparable sample sizes for the commitment decision across treatments.
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experimenter as participants followed along on paper. The experiments were programmed using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the experiment began participants took a quiz (nonincentivized) to confirm their understanding of the experimental procedures. An experimenter
reviewed the quiz answers and privately answered questions.
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment. Participants were
randomly assigned to a group of two and remained within this group for all 30 periods of the
experiment (fixed matching). In every session, each period proceeded according to one of the
treatments. In Stage 1 participants chose between `Flip’ and `Don’t Flip’ (except in the
Exogenous-Free treatment). In Stage 2, those who opted to see the coin flip chose between
`Agree’ and `Don’t Agree’ after seeing the result of the flip. In Stage 3, participants chose to
expend any number between 0 and 100 francs, in order to increase the probability of winning the
prize of 100 francs. At the end of each period, the computer displayed individual decisions, as
well as corresponding payoffs, to each participant.
At the end of each experimental session, participants completed a brief demographic
survey and their total earnings from all 30 periods of the experiment were added to or subtracted
from an initial endowment of 2,000 francs (which we described as a participation fee). We
converted francs to USD at a rate of 100 francs = $1, and participants were paid privately in cash
and dismissed from the experiment. The average experimental earnings, including the $20
participation fee, were $25.24, ranging from a low of $16.00 to a high of $46.70. Sessions lasted
approximately one hour each.

6

3. Results
We observed early period variation that settled down after a few periods and endgame effects,
both of which introduced noise into our data. Thus, we restrict our analysis to periods 5-29.6
Table 1 reports average frequency of conflict resolution, opting-in and commitment, as well as
conflict expenditures and payoffs. We also report the statistical significance of estimated
treatment effects for each of the outcome variables of interest. To control for repeated measures,
our regressions employ mixed-effects models. The fixed effects are identical across regressions;
we include treatment dummy variables and a period trend. Rows 1-3 of Table 1 employ random
effects for each group, and rows 4-6 employ random effects for each group and nested
participant-in-group. Rows 1-4 estimate logistic regressions and rows 5-6 estimate linear models.

3.1. Conflict Resolution
In the Exogenous-Free treatment, pairs avoided conflict 54% of the time (i.e., they agree to the
result of the Flip), while in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments, pairs
avoided conflict 41% and 20% of the time, respectively. Mixed-effects logistic regression
analysis indicates that the rate of conflict resolution is significantly lower in the EndogenousCostly treatment than in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments (p-values < 0.01),
while there is no significant difference between the Free treatments (p-value = 0.24).

Result 1: Contrary to standard game theoretic predictions, there is substantial conflict resolution
in all three treatments, although pairs avoid conflict more frequently in the Exogenous-Free and
Endogenous-Free treatments than in the Endogenous-Costly treatment.

6

None of our results are qualitatively altered when we vary these cutoffs, and additional regression output is
available from the authors upon request.
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This finding provides support for the idea that non-binding conflict resolution
mechanisms can reduce the frequency of conflict, despite incentives to renege. When using the
mechanism is a default, some groups are able to coordinate on a reciprocal strategy in which the
losing party is willing to accept an unfavorable resolution. However, the mechanism is far from
perfect. When the decision to use the mechanism is endogenous, conflict frequency increased as
some groups opted not to see the coin flip. Similarly, there is extensive heterogeneity in the
willingness to commit to the outcome, which we discuss further in Section 3.5.

3.2. Opting-In
A major source of increased conflict frequency in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly
treatments is failure to opt-in to the coin flip mechanism. While pairs were required to see the
flip in the Exogenous-Free treatment, they opted to see the coin flip 71% of the time in the
Endogenous-Free treatment and only 26% of the time in the Endogenous-Costly treatment.
Mixed-effects logistic regression analysis indicates that the rate of opting-in is significantly
lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment (p-value <
0.01). Here we exclude the Exogenous-Free treatment from the regression since all pairs were
forced to see the coin flip.

Result 2: Subjects opted-in to the coin flip mechanism less frequently in the Endogenous-Costly
treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment, although the likelihood was far greater than 0
(and less than 1) in both treatments.

8

While it is clear that the cost of observing the coin flip played an important role in
reducing the frequency with which participants opted-in in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, the
reasons are less clear in the Endogenous-Free treatment. In theory, participants should be
indifferent between observing the coin flip and not observing the flip. Indeed, if there were any
probability that a player who lost the flip would tremble and mistakenly accept the outcome,
players would strictly prefer to flip the coin. We leave this question for future research.

3.3. Commitment
The money-maximizing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts that participants losing the
coin flip will never commit to the outcome. Comparing averages across treatments in Table 1,
we found that the probability that both parties committed to the outcome (conditional on seeing
the flip) were 54% in the Exogenous-Free, 58% in the Endogenous-Free, and 76% in the
Endogenous-Costly treatment. Mixed-effects logistic regression analysis indicates that
conditional probability that both parties commit to the coin flip resolution is significantly higher
in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in either the Endogenous-Free or Exogenous-Free
treatments (p-values < 0.01).
The treatment differences were almost solely driven by an increased willingness of
participants who lose the coin flip to commit to its outcome. The conditional probability of
committing to the flip among those receiving unfavorable outcomes was 58% in ExogenousFree, 61% in Endogenous-Free, and 78% in Endogenous-Costly treatment. 7 To provide
statistical support for treatment differences in individual commitment decisions, we estimate an
additional mixed-effects logistic regression. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 when an

7

In all treatments the conditional probability of commitment for flip winners was at least 95%. Rejections are
concentrated in a few individuals (44 of the 76 rejections come from 9 of 198 participants, three per treatment).
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individual agreed to the outcome of the flip and 0 otherwise, and we restrict the sample of
observations to the losers of the coin flip (they are the only ones facing commitment problems).
The independent variables are a period trend and the three treatment dummy variables. Nested
random effects are included for each participant-in-group to control for repeated measures. The
coefficient on the Endogenous-Costly treatment is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), and
the difference between the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly coefficients is significant
(p-value = 0.02). These findings are summarized in Result 3.

Result 3: The conditional probability of commitment is higher in the Endogenous-Costly
treatment than either in the Endogenous-Free or Exogenous-Free treatments. There is no
significant difference between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments.

These results suggest that merely endogenizing the decision to seek third-party conflict
resolution does not have an impact on the probability that parties commit to the proposed
resolution – we find no difference in commitment rates in the Endogenous-Free and ExogenousFree treatments. However, the commitment problem is significantly mitigated when both parties
must incur a cost to learn the proposed allocation.
The relationship between opting-in and the commitment problem in the Endogenous-Free
and Endogenous-Costly treatments is demonstrated in Figure 2, which plots the relative
frequency of opting-in against the conditional probability of commitment for each pair with
smoothing splines fit to the data by treatment. 8 Only the Endogenous-Free and EndogenousCostly treatments are plotted, since participants in the Exogenous-Free treatment always saw the
coin flip. Figure 2 indicates that there is a linear relationship between opting-in and committing
8

An alternative figure containing data from all 30 periods is in Appendix B.
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to the outcome of the flip in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, but there is a convex relationship
between the two in the Endogenous-Free treatment – there is a pair that sees the flip in every
period, but never commits to the outcome. In fact, while the Endogenous-Costly treatment data is
roughly symmetrically distributed around the 45-degree line, every Endogenous-Free treatment
observation lies on or below the line. In the Endogenous-Free treatment, commitment is
regularly sustained only at high rates of opting-in. This provides further evidence that the
opportunity cost of opting-in in the Endogenous-Costly treatment facilitates the solution of the
commitment problem, while the absence of such a cost in the Endogenous-Free treatment
renders the cooperative signal less informative and is thus less effective at encouraging
commitment.

3.4. Conflict Expenditures
If groups did not opt-in or failed to solve the commitment problem, the group entered the conflict
stage in which they exerted expenditures to win the prize. Returning to Table 1, note that the
average expenditure was greatest in Exogenous-Free treatment (28.6), followed by the
Endogenous-Free treatment (24.6), and the least in the Endogenous-Costly treatment (18.6).9
Mixed-effects linear regression analysis with nested random effects for each participant-in-group
indicates that conflict expenditures are substantially (but only marginally significantly) lower in
the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the Exogenous-Free treatment (p-value = 0.074). There
is no significant difference between the Endogenous-Costly and Endogenous-Free treatments (pvalue = 0.16) or between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments (p-value = 0.65).

9

Figures B1-B3 in Appendix B report time series of conflict expenditures for each pair by treatment.
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Result 4: Conflict expenditures are lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the
Exogenous-Free treatment. There is no statistically significant difference between the
Endogenous-Costly and Endogenous-Free treatments or between the Endogenous-Free and
Exogenous-Free treatments.

3.5. Between-Pair Heterogeneity
Figure 3 displays, for each treatment, the relative frequency of opting-in, conditional frequency
of commitment, and average payoff, by pair, where the pairs are sorted from left to right in each
panel by opting-in rate with ties broken by commitment rate and then average payoff.
In the Endogenous-Free treatment, there is a significant positive correlation between a
pair’s observed probability of opting-in and average payoff (ρ = 0.62, p-value < 0.01) but in the
Endogenous-Costly treatment, this relationship is not statistically significant (ρ = 0.23, p-value =
0.12). This is driven by a number of pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment that never optedin to see the coin flip but nevertheless received very high payoffs.
It is possible to visually identify three types of pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment:
(1) pairs with a high rate of both opting-in and commitment, (2) pairs with low (but positive)
rates of both opting-in and commitment, and (3) pairs with zero rates of opting-in. Heuristically,
we define high flip pairs as those with opting-in rates in the interval (0.5, 1], low flip pairs as
those with opting-in rates in (0, 0.5], and no flip pairs as those with opting-in rates of exactly 0.
High flip pairs earn on average 85 francs/period (SD = 15.6), low flip pairs earn 50 francs/period
(SD = 38.8), and no flip pairs earn 73 francs/period (SD = 24.6). Interestingly, 5 of the no flip
pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment (i.e., pairs that engaged in conflict in each period 5-29)
generated average earnings greater than the maximum that could be earned per period by opting-
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in and committing in every period (i.e., greater than 90 francs). None of the no flip pairs in the
Endogenous-Free treatment were able generate average earnings greater than 90 francs.
While our data do not allow us to directly identify the source of this behavior, we
conjecture the positive commitment cost generated an endogenous focal point for conflict
expenditures that allowed some pairs to coordinate on expenditures far below the Nash
equilibrium of 25. Wald tests cannot reject the null hypotheses that the average conflict
expenditure for the Exogenous-Free or Endogenous-Free pairs was the Nash Equilibrium value
of 25 (p-value = 0.95 and p-value = 0.44, respectively). However, in the Exogenous-Costly pairs,
the average expenditure was significantly less than 25 (p-value < 0.01). When we exclude the no
flip pairs, the average expenditure rises and is not significantly different from 25 (p-value =
0.63).

4. Discussion
In all three treatments, the prediction from standard game theory is that the loser of the coin flip
will never choose to commit, as the expected value from conflict is strictly positive.
Nevertheless, our experiment shows that individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the
outcome of a randomizing conflict resolution mechanism, even in the absence of binding
contractual agreements. What can explain these non-zero levels of commitment? There are
several reasons why commitment problems can be solved in the absence of external enforcement.
First, game theory shows that simple rational agents may abide by the outcome of the conflict
resolution mechanism as a result of a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987; Gintis, 2009). In
such a case, a coin flip may serve as a coordination device. Second, if the parties expect to
engage in repeated interaction, they may be able to overcome the commitment problem due to
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reputational concerns (Rabin, 1991; Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Dellarocas, 2006) or fear of
incurring retaliation and spite (Abbink et al., 2010; Lacomba et al., 2011; Mago et al., 2012;
Schniter et al., 2013). Similarly, some individuals may simply prefer to avoid conflict or be
cooperative (Dorris, 1972; Molander, 1985), and given repeated interaction, they establish a
reputation for cooperation that allows both parties to gain from exchange. As long as one
member of the group is a cooperative type, the other member may be willing to forgo conflict to
reap the gains from exchange (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982). For these reasons, it may not be that
surprising that in all three treatments we observe substantial conflict resolution.
One of the main research questions was whether commitment problems could be
mitigated when participants are given the option of opting-in to the conflict resolution
mechanism (with and without cost). Here, the failure of participants to opt-in reduced the
frequency of conflict resolution relative to the exogenous case, and more so when seeing the flip
was costly. However, for participants that did opt-in, we observed significantly higher
commitment, but only when opting-in was costly.
Standard models do not predict these treatment differences. What can explain these
differences in commitment rates? There are several non-mutually exclusive (and non-exhaustive)
possibilities. First, when individuals act collectively to propose a solution to a social dilemma,
the result may be seen as more legitimate than when the proposed solution comes from
“outside”, thus increasing cooperation levels. Evidence from both field studies and laboratory
experiments suggests that endogenous participation in democratic institutions may encourage
both cooperation and compliance (see Dal Bo et al., 2010). Although we believe that legitimacy
may play a role in helping groups to resolve commitment problems, our data do not provide
support for this hypothesis. Specifically, the legitimacy hypothesis would suggest that since
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participants choose to opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, the coin flip outcome will
acquire additional legitimacy in both participants’ eyes and will thus facilitate solving the
commitment problem. Hence, we would expect commitment rates to be greater in both the
Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments than in the Exogenous-Free treatment.
However, we find no significant difference in commitment rates between the Endogenous-Free
and Exogenous-Free treatments.
A second possible explanation of our observations is that fears of retaliation and spite
may discourage participants from reneging (i.e., opting-in and then not abiding by the outcome
may encourage high bids by angered flip winners) (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Dellarocas, 2006;
Lacomba et al., 2011; Schniter et al., 2013). While we cannot rule out this explanation, our data
do not reveal notable differences in the conflict expenditures of flip winners and losers.
Additional unreported regressions (available upon request) indicate that the only significant
difference is that flip losers bid more than winners in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, opposite
to the direction of the retaliation hypothesis.
A third explanation is that individuals who pay to see the coin flip may be subject to a
sunk cost fallacy; they might justify committing to the coin flip in order to avoid the regret of
wasting money on unused advice (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Gino, 2008). We cannot rule out this
explanation – though it seems implausible since the expected value of conflict is positive and
greater than the sunk cost of seeing the flip.
A final explanation receives the most substantial support from our data: the act of optingin may serve as a signal of participant’s willingness to cooperate. That is, commitment is
encouraged when both parties know that the other has deliberately sent a signal of willingness to
cooperate, but this signal is more than cheap talk only when it involves incurring an opportunity
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cost. 10 Under this interpretation, the willingness to incur a cost of opting-in indicates a
willingness to accept the outcome of the coin flip, and agents are able to infer cooperative
intentions (to commit) more readily from costly opting-in than from free opting-in. In this sense,
the mechanism encourages self-selection among cooperative types. In the repeated game setting,
non-cooperative types are going to be found out early on unless they feign being a cooperative
type. It may therefore be worthwhile to opt-in to see whether one is paired with a cooperative
type, since they can always avoid the costly conflict resolution mechanism in the future after
they have been cheated once. These considerations may explain why commitment rates are
greater in treatments where opting-in is costly than when it is exogenous or costless.

5. Conclusion
This paper explores the effectiveness of non-binding institutions for conflict resolution and the
effect of endogenous institutional choice on their success. Empirically, the main problem with
such mechanisms is: how do groups commit to abiding by the outcome of a conflict resolution
mechanism? This paper suggests that one way of mitigating this problem is to make the choice of
opting-in to the mechanism costly. Although the mere act of opting-in has no significant impact
on commitment rates, costly opting-in substantially increases commitment for groups who pay
the price.
Our results have important implications for the sustainability of cooperation and the
mitigation of conflict in environments with weak contract enforcement. First, using a coin flip as
a conflict resolution mechanism has numerous benefits for studying the commitment problems
inherent in conflict resolution: it is transparent and easy to understand, it provides an unbiased

10

Indeed, there is evidence for this in other contexts where incurred opportunity costs facilitate reciprocity (McCabe
et al., 2000, 2003).
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means of allocating indivisible resources (consistent with egalitarian norms), and its “all-ornothing” nature exacerbates the commitment problem, since losing participants must commit to
receiving nothing.11 Second, endogenizing and imposing a cost on the decision to opt-in activates
reciprocity – by requiring individuals to undertake an opportunity cost to seek conflict resolution,
the decision substantially increases the rate at which parties commit to conflict resolution. These
(and similar) behavioral mechanisms are clearly important drivers of economic behavior and thus
have an important role in any institutional design framework. When developing institutions to
reduce conflict and facilitate mutually beneficial exchange, designers should consider not only
standard incentive-compatibility issues but also the interaction between institutions and norms of
cooperation and reciprocity. In particular, when the absence of exogenous enforcement
mechanisms renders incentive-compatible arrangements infeasible, one way to reduce the costs
of conflict may involve institutions designed to encourage reciprocity-driven pro-sociality.

11

Using a random device as a conflict resolution mechanism has a long history. Iannaccone et al. (2011) argue that
the Oracle at Delphi promoted cooperation amongst the Greek city-states despite providing random outcomes.
Another well-known historical example of commitment to a random device is the battlefield agreement to settle a
conflict by single combat between two renowned warriors. More familiar examples of conflict resolution via random
device are abundant. Rock-paper-scissors, drawing straws, and throwing dice settle many friendly disputes.
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Table 1: Average Frequency of Conflict Resolution, Opting-in and Commitment, as well as
Conflict Expenditures and Payoffs (Periods 5-29)
Treatment
Exogenous-Free
0.54 (0.50)
N=550

Endogenous-Free
0.41 (0.49)
N=775

Endogenous-Costly
0.20 (0.40) *#
N=1150

Both Opt-In

1.00
N=550

0.71 (0.46) *
N=775

0.26 (0.44) *#
N=1150

Both Commit

0.54 (0.50)
N=550

0.58 (0.49)
N=547

0.76 (0.43) *#
N=296

Flip-Loser Commits

0.58 (0.49)
N=550

0.61 (0.49)
N=547

0.78 (0.42)*#
N=296

Conflict Expenditure

28.56 (18.93)
N=502

24.62 (20.08)
N=912

18.58 (19.27) ^
N=1848

Payoff

36.97 (52.54)
N=1100

35.52 (51.59)
N=1550

33.53 (51.19)
N=2300

Conflict Resolution

Standard deviation reported in parentheses. Each reported variable was regressed against treatment dummy
variables and a period trend, with standard errors clustered at the group level. Rows 1-3 employ mixed-effects
models with random effects for each group, and rows 4-6 employ mixed-effects models with random effects for
each group and nested participant-in-group. Rows 1-4 estimate logistic regressions and rows 5-6 estimate linear
models. Amounts noted with * signify the treatment coefficient was significantly different from the ExogenousFree coefficient, p-value < 0.05. Amounts noted with # signify the treatment coefficient was significantly
different from the Endogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.05. Amounts noted with ^ signify the treatment
coefficient was significantly different from the Exogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.1.
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Figure 1: Game Tree
Stage 1:
Opting-in
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Don’t Flip

Flip
Player 2
Flip

Don’t Flip

Flip

Don’t Flip

Both Players See
Results of Flip
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Commitment
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Contest

Don’t Agree

Agree

Expected payoff
π1 = ve1/(e1+e2) – e1
π2 = ve2/(e1+e2) – e2

Player 2
Agree

Don’t Agree

Agree

Don’t Agree

Expected payoff
π1 = v/2 - c
π2 = v/2 - c

Stage 3:
Contest
Expected payoff
π1 = ve1/(e1+e2) - e1 - c
π2 = ve2/(e1+e2) - e2 - c
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1.0

Figure 2: Probability of Both Opting-in vs. Conditional Probability of Both Committing
(Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly Treatments, Periods 5-29)

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

Conditional Probability of Joint Commitment

Free
Costly
45°

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Probability of Opting In
Note: Each point represents the probability of opting-in and the conditional probability of commitment for a single
pair over periods 5-29; the lines plot smoothing spline fits to the data with 3 DF.
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Figure 3: Average Profits, Opting-in and Commitment by Pair and Treatment
(Periods 5-29)
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Appendix A (Not for Publication) – Instructions
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn
an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash.
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we sum your total earnings for all 30 periods
and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk,
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate you
following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each
period.
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-participant groups. You and the
other participant in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30
periods. You will remain within the same two-participant group for all 30 periods.
In each period of the experiment one of the two participants in your group will receive the reward. The
reward is worth 100 francs. Each period of the experiment consists of as many as three decision stages.
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1
In Stage 1, both participants will have the opportunity to choose whether they want to Flip a computer coin
in order to determine who will receive the reward. An example of your decision screen is shown below.

If you want to flip the coin, check Flip. If both participants choose Flip, the computer will subtract 5
francs from both participants’ earnings for the period, and both participants will enter Stage 2. However, if either
participant chooses Don’t Flip, then both participants will skip Stage 2 and enter Stage 3, and the 5 francs will not
be subtracted from either participant.
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2
If both participants choose Flip in Stage 1, the computer will flip a coin. There is a 50% chance the coin
lands heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If the computer coin lands heads one participant will receive the
reward, if it lands tails, the other participant receives the reward. The flip outcome determines who receives the
reward. So, there are two possible payoffs:
If You Receive the Reward
Earnings = 100 – 5 francs
If The Other Participant Receives the Reward
Earnings = 0 – 5 francs
In Stage 2, both participants will have to choose whether they want to Agree to the outcome of a computer
coin flip. An example of your decision screen is shown below.
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If you want to agree, check Agree. If both participants choose to Agree, the computer will assign earnings
to participants according to the coin flip and the period is over, meaning that neither participant enters Stage 3.
However, if either participant chooses Don’t Agree, then both participants will enter Stage 3, but the 5 francs will
be subtracted from both participants since they have agreed in Stage 1 to flip a coin.
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 3
If either participant checked Don’t Flip in Stage 1 or checked Don’t Agree in Stage 2, each participant
enters Stage 3. In this stage, each participant may bid for the 100 franc reward. You may bid any integer number
of francs between 0 and 100. An example of your decision screen is shown below.

The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant bids, the
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid, you will receive 1 lottery ticket and
for each franc the other participant bids, the other participant will receives 1 lottery ticket. After both participants
make their bids, the computer will draw randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other
participant. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each ticket has an equal chance of
winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total
number of tickets bought by you and the other participant.
Chance of Receiving the Reward =
Your Total Lottery Tickets
Sum of Your and Other Participant’s Lottery Tickets
If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants.
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After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in the
following way:
If either participant decided Don’t Flip in Stage 1:
If you receive the reward:
Earnings = 100 – Your Bid
If you do not receive the reward:
Earnings = 0 – Your Bid
If both participants decided Flip in Stage 1, but either participant decided Don’t Agree in Stage 2:
If you receive the reward:
Earnings = 100 – Your Bid – 5 francs
If you do not receive the reward:
Earnings = 0 – Your Bid – 5 francs
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 2,000 francs). In any period,
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will sum the total earnings for
all 30 periods of the experiment and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we
will subtract them from your participation fee. If the summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your
participation fee.
An Example
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of 100
francs. If you bid 30 francs and the other participant bids 20 francs, then you receive 30 lottery tickets and the other
participant receives 20 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 50 (30 + 20). As
you can see, you have a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.60 = 30/50. The other participant has a 0.40 =
20/50 chance of receiving the reward.
After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you received the
reward or not.
At the end of each period, the computer will display all decision in all three stages on the outcome screen.
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet
under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below.

IMPORTANT NOTES
In each period, you and another participant have the opportunity to receive a reward worth 100 francs. In
Stage 1 each participant chooses either Flip or Don’t Flip. If both participants choose Flip, then both participants
pay 5 francs and the experiment moves to Stage 2. In Stage 2 the outcome of the coin flip is revealed, and both
participants choose either Agree or Don’t Agree. If both participants choose Agree, the outcome of the coin flip is
made final and the payoffs are computed for each participant. On the other hand, if either participant chooses Don’t
Flip in Stage 1 or if either participant chooses Don’t Agree in Stage 2, both participants enter Stage 3. Then, each
participant submits a bid for the reward, and the reward is allocated by a random computerized draw. Are there any
questions?
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Appendix B (Not for Publication) – Additional Figures
Figure B1: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Exogenous-Free Treatment

Significant Trend
Insignificant Trend
OLS Fit

Total Expenditure

0 510 20 30
80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0
0 510 20 30

0 510 20 30

Period
Panels ordered from the top by probability of conflict.

28

Figure B2: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Endogenous-Free Treatment
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Figure B3: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Endogenous-Costly Treatment
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1.0

Figure B4: Probability of Both Opting-in vs. Conditional Probability of Both Committing
(Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly Treatments, All Periods)
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Note: Each point represents the probability of opting-in and the conditional probability of commitment for a single
pair over all 30 periods; the lines plot smoothing spline fits to the data with 3 DF.
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Figure B5: Average Profits, Opting-in and Commitment by Pair and Treatment
(All Periods)
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